INTRODUCTION
Italy constitutes a crucial case for the investigation into changes of patronage practices in contemporary democracies. According to Kopecky and Scherlis (2008) , the so-called Italian "First
Republic" was in fact a paradigmatic case of the diffusion of "bureaucratic clientelism" characterised by: a) the distribution of an enormous quantity of posts at all levels of the administration, and; b) the presence of reward as the dominant motivation behind political appointments.
Bureaucratic clientelism is held to occur in South European systems which share historical developments that have produced administrative systems distinct from the Weberian ideal type.
Administrative organisation and behavior have been shaped by the Napoleonic tradition widely diffused in Southern Europe (Peters 2008) . The emphasis on state power over the role of society that distinguishes Napoleonic tradition conforms to the role of the State in Southern societies of "assisted capitalism" (Sotiropoulos 2004 ). The State in Italy has traditionally promoted economic development through strategies and instruments (protectionism, transfers, subsidies, control of industries) used in a very particularistic fashion. The long-term dependence of the Italian weak bourgeouisie on the State has prevented distributional particularism from being reviewed by the rise of Weberian administrative structures (Amato 1979 ).
An administrative system with low institutional capacity, affected by multiple organisational and functional contradictions, has thus resulted from historical development (Cassese 1993) . The Italian system has long displayed the features typical of the prevalent southern European bureaucratic model: a) patronage at the bottom, clientelistic patterns in the recruitment of lowranking officials; b) formalism and legalism complemented by informal shadow governance structures; c) uneven distribution of resources, institutional fragmentation and insufficient mechanisms for policy-coordination; e) absence of a typical European administrative élite (Sotiropoulos 2004 ).
An administrative elite equipped with an esprit de corps has never formed due to the lack of highly selective recruitment channels. The Italian administrative elite has been described as an "ossified world" (Cassese 1999) elderly and with little professionalisation, where promotions were rewards for age and length of service, without horizontal and vertical mobility, dominated by the formalism of personnel almost exclusively trained in law. The low level of professionalism allowed the top ministerial bureaucracy to form a pact of reciprocal self restraint with politicians. The pact was based on the exchange between job security and political power: bureaucrats renounced an autonomous and pro-active role in processes of policy-making, while parties refrained from interfering in the management of careers -the primary preoccupation of a bureaucracy gone "southern", characterised by a patrimonial conception of public service, dedicated to administrating itself rather than the country. The roots of the exchange between job security and political power can also be traced back to the key features of the old "polarized pluralism" : tripolar centrifugal competition and centre occupied by the DC that made any total alternation in power impossible (Sartori 1976) . Due to the low average duration of unstable coalitions, ministers did not have the time to gain control of their departments, nor had they the motivation to do so in such a short-term perspective.
"Patronage at the top", a key feature of Southern systems, has not been extensive in the ministerial domain, while it has flourished in the Italian parallel administration, "a complex and probably unique mélange of parastatal bodies, public agencies and public corporations" (Golden 2003, 202) , marked by increasing extension and plurality of organisational models. Parties have pursued a strategy of colonisation (Sartori 2005 ) by penetrating via party-nominated appointees all spheres of Italian society which came under full control of, or largely dependent upon, the parties" organisational networks entrenched within an overgrown public sector.
The deep colonisation of an "available State" (Di Palma 1979) constituted the condition for the affirmation and reproduction of partitocrazia, a regime at first characterised by the substantial monopoly of parties over political activity and, later, by the progressive expansion of their power into the social and economic spheres (Pasquino 1995) . The legitimacy deficit of the Italian democracy has been compensated by the organisational strength of its political parties which dominated the political system (Morlino 1998) . The weakness of public bureaucracies, the interventionist tradition of the State in the economic sector, and the necessity to mantain the precarious consensus for a regime affected by exclusive legitimation, have thus conferred relevance to patronage as a crucial resource in the Italian pattern of democratic consolidation.
Between party system change and administrative reforms: Italy as a transitional context
At the beginning of the 1990s changes in the international environment shook the foundations of partitocrazia: the end of the two bloc system of international relations sanctioned the definitive erosion of the bases of systemic polarisation that had determined electoral and governmental alliances; the parties in government also saw the growth of constraints imposed by the process of European integration on the irresponsible particularistic distribution of material resources (Cotta 1996) . The exhaustion of ideological polarisation and material public resources, which had fed competition among the old parties, accentuated the turbulence in the internal environment.
International changes facilitated the launching of challenges to partitocrazia by various actors that provoked the increasing destructuration of parties and the party system. Between 1992 and 1994, "atomisation" was reached, characterised by exceptional fluidity and uncertainty as much in party organisations as in their systemic interactions (Di Virgilio 2006) .
It was in 1994 that a new process of consolidation of the party system began. The introduction of new electoral laws as a majoritarian institutional arrangement precipitated the collapse of the old parties and stimulated the consolidation of a new set of competitive interactions. The party system had undergone a radical transformation: most of the parties participating in the 1994 election were either brand new or had been affected by a profound change. The party system has assumed the features of "fragmented bipolarism" (D"Alimonte 2005) . Systemic atomisation has been overcome thanks to a new two-level system composed not only of parties but also of pre-electoral coalitions.
The alternation in government between pre-electoral coalitions has become the new predictable structure of competition (Cotta and Verzichelli 2000) . If pre-electoral coalitions have provided for the re-freezing of the party system, the single party organisations have remained thawed, as demonstrated by the party supply, incessantly re-modelled by fissions and fusions of party labels.
Atomisation has been overtaken by change in the party system, but this has left a legacy of crisis among parties as organisations with scarce or absent levels of institutionalisation. The nature of governmental coalitions is still fragmented and heterogenous, heightened by the uncertainty of a system where only the bipolar mechanics has been stabilised while the format has remained subject to fluidity.
The collapse of the old parties, that have been unwilling to modify a dysfunctional bureaucratic machine, created a unique window of opportunity for administrative reforms that profoundly reshaped three dimensions of the Italian State (Lewanski 1999; Natalini 2006) . The first dimension is the substantial retreat from direct intervention and entrepreneuship in the economy in favour of a regulatory role. Independent autorithies have been created to regulate liberalised markets, while privatisation processes have radically reduced the size of the State and reorganised the remaining public enterprises into shareholder companies controlled by Treasury.
Up to the late 1980s Italy had one of the largest state-owned sectors among Western economies: 12 out of the 20 largest non financial companies were state-owned and 90 per cent of financial investment was provided by state controlled banks. The turning point came in 1992 when a public finance and currency crisis materialised. Privatisation in Italy produced the second highest revenues in Europe after the UK. Real progress has been made since the mid-1990s in reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio which amounted to 124.8 per cent in 1994. Privatisation was a main component of the restrictive budget policy pursued in order to meet the criteria to join the EMU. Between (Citroni 2009 ). The universe of local corporations is the expanding semi-public appendage of the already fragmented galaxy of Italian public institutions shown by Table 1.
- Table 1 About Here -
THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The empirical analysis that follows proposes to ascertain how far the radical changes of the 1990s have affected the diffusion, logic and mechanisms of patronage. The analysis aims to fill a gap in the greater part of the literature, which continues to associate Italy with the old patronage practices that developed in a political-administrative context overturned by the crisis of the 1990s.
For each policy sector five experts have been interviewed, leading to a total of 45 interviews. 
The scope of political appointments: Range and depth
Patronage is still pervasive in the Italian public sector. The analysis of formal opportunities for patronage practices reveals the high susceptability of Italian public bodies to party influence over the distribution of positions. Political appointments are actually allowed by the legal framework for most institutional types of all policy sectors and parties make use of existing opportunities to fill in positions with political appointees. The only institutional sub-type that remains formally unaffected by patronage is the executing level for the Judiciary. where patronage is more pervasive. It is followed by Non-Departmental Agencies and Commissions and Executing institutions which remain less penetrated by patronage practices.
- Table 2 About HereData on the range and depth of patronage offer a more differentiated picture of patronage across institutional types and policy sectors. Table 3 - Table 3 About HereThe relevance of political influence is very low in the judicial offices because distribution of posts is doled out among the organised factions of the magistracy. Associated magistracy exploits its own quantitative and qualitative power at the heart of the CSM, the Judiciary"s self-governing body, which is the repository of the formal power of nomination. The legal framework makes less permeable the Education and Culture sector, where the complexity and rigidity of formal recruitment procedures protect the public school system from political interference. The strictly hierarchical organisational structure contributes to maintaining substantially impenetrable executing institutions in the Military and Police sector, such as the Armed Forces and the Fire Brigade, both of which are composed of professional bodies that privilege technical-bureaucratic rather than political criteria in internal career paths. The motivation valid for the Armed Force also hold for the Ministry of Defence, the only ministerial institution to remain unaffected by patronage. The strength of corps makes political penetration particularly difficult in military institutions where seniority and bureaucratic solidarity are the guiding criteria in the awarding of posts. The low range of the executing institutions of the Foreign Affairs sector is motivated by the low strategic salience of many of these institutions (consulates and a large share of embassies), which leads parties to concentrate their efforts on a few organisations (permanent representations, embassies and institutes of culture that operate with strategic partners) that require a strict congruence between the policy orientations of the executive and administrative action. In the Financial sector, finally, the Bank of Italy continues in its tradition of impermeability thanks to the complexity of its institutional mission, which requires the awarding of posts according to strictly merit-based criteria. Table 4 shows that the depth of patronage does vary across the institutional spheres. The depth of patronage decreases in extra-ministerial domains at the central level of government. Political appointments tend to be restricted to the top level of disaggregated institutions.
- Table 4 the expansion of subnational administration offered to fill with political appointments at all levels extra-ministerial organisations created from scratch. Moreover, the adoption of the enterprise formula in the regional healthcare systems has not succeeded in depoliticising local healthcare authorities which constitute arena of massive party rent-seeking. Subnational governments lacks professional bodies as hindrance to patronage expansion, since they do not operate in policy sectors characterised by established career paths. Besides professional reasons, it must be noted that feeble pressures by the EU for the liberalisation of local public service markets allowed subnational governments to extend their hold over local economies, using corporatization in order to increase the sphere of particularistic exchange which, at the local level, and especially in Southern Italy, is clearly wider and deeper than at the national level.
Logic and mechanisms of patronage
For most intervieews, political appointments are made primarily for controlling public institutions. The prevalence of strategies of control in appointment processes affects the criteria parties use when selecting appointees. To occupy strategic positions that control resources crucial in processes of policy-making, parties are obliged to select individuals with at least a modicum of expertise. As can be seen in Figure 4 , the professional competence of appointees is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for exercising control over the State.
- Figure Interior and Police and assumes the form of the sharing rather than the division of appointments.
The majority enjoy the power of proposal, while the opposition evaluate the government"s proposals and may veto candidates they consider incapable of offering adequate guarantees of impartiality. The sharing of the power of appointment between government and opposition is owed to the peculiarity of the sector which controls the administration of elections (Interior) and manages public order (Police). The common interest in the equality of the civil and political rights that feed the democratic process push government and opposition to consult one another so as to choose personnel loyal to both of them.
In other sectors of the central level of administration clear cut spoils system mechanisms prevail.
The bipolar structure of competition creates strong pressures towards majoritarian patronage practices. The wholesale alternation in government urges coalitions to acquire exclusive control of posts considered strategic. In regional and local administration, the opposition have easier access to positions. This is particularly the case in the south of Italy because of the extreme fragmentation of party systems, characterised by the balkanisation of an extremely personalised representation. In Southern Italy parties are not even able to fulfil the procedural role of expression and support for a government. Southern executives lacking a coherent parliamentary base offer patronage opportunities to individual members of the opposition in order to build coalitions of variable geometry that ensure their precarious stability. In central and northern Italy, on the other hand, more structured party systems reinforce the control of the majority over sub-national administrations. In these areas of the country the opposition is excluded from selection processes for candidates for strategic positions, but do have stable access to numerous positions on boards of agencies and in local public utilities.
Evolution of patronage practices over time
The collapse of the party system between 1992-1994 and the wave of administrative reforms of the 1990s brought considerable discontinuity to the patronage practices along many of the analytical dimensions examined in the project as shown in table .
- Table 5 About HereAs far as the role of parties in policy sectors is concerned, the clear decline of political control over the Justice sector should be underlined. In the past cooperation between old parties in processes of appointment allowed them to exploit the internal divisions within the associated magistracy. Old parties were able to influence the selection of magistrates with whom they had formed strong ties.
The advent of a strongly polarised party system on judicial issues has provoked a rupture in practices of exchange between coalitions. New parties are no longer able to qualitatively increase their quantitative weakness in the CSM through the old consensual arrangements which have been undermined by fierce polarisation 3 .
As far as the role of parties in different types of institutions is concerned, the traditional relevance The unbearable financial weight of the "party governmentness" (Katz 1986 ) that characterised the According to Katz, in advanced democracies the political party "becomes a label by which a group of leaders is known and an organization for coordinating elite activity" (Katz 1990, 146) . The party that no longer fulfils representative functions in society becomes an integrated network of office holders, a stable organisational structure of the governmental process within the State. The absence of institutionalisation renders Katz"s definition invalid for the new Italian parties. The new Italian parties are only able to fulfil the "labelling function" typical in cases of atomisation in the party system.
The new organisations can only be defined as parties in the sense of Sartori"s minimal definition, that is political groups identified by an official label that present at elections and are capable of placing through elections candidates for public office. As Sartori (1976) notes, this definition pays no attention to organisational requirements. In this definition the only cohesive element required is the label that gathers stable coalitions of office-holders and candidates. For Sartori (2005, 15-16) ,
"before the advent of the mass parties it proper to speak of "parties" (as stabilised coalitions of leaders) but not of the party system (as being a structured system)". Western European systems have been structured by the rise of the mass party which "resides in the linkage, in the fact that the party is made of its connecting network. The mass party may well remain loose and thus resemble a federation. Still, its costituent units are no longer persons but impersonal agencies; that is, the leaders are no longer above the party" (Sartori 2005, 15) . As underlined by the turnover in party affiliations, which made the political offer particularly fluid after the crisis of pluralised polarism, leaders in Italy have returned to being above the parties. The infrastructure of the new organisations is not the institutionalised connecting network left by the mass parties to the cartel parties in stable systems. It was instead personal power that took the place of the connecting network in a context of systemic atomisation in which the party could not stay above the leaders, in the sense that "the party both outlasts its leaders and binds them to its logic of inertia" (Sartori 2005, 12) .
As new organisations that emerged after the exceptional crisis of the old system, Italian parties can only function as labels, coalitions of leaders incapable of structuring the actions of elites within governmental institutions through procedural mechanisms. It is the leaders who control the process of building parties that prosper as vehicles for professionals who use electoral success for personal profit (Lawson 2007) . Rather than a devise that strengthens pre-existing party networks (Ware 1996) , patronage can only strengthen Italian leaders. Old parties colonisation-oriented built extensive networks in a pervasive public sector as systems of organisational occupancy of the Italian society. Contemporary political leaders build new parties as labels cemented by institutional resources that feed private networks.
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